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ABSTRACT
This study has tried to clarify Confederate popular 
attitudes towards England and, to the extent she impinged on the 
subject, to France*
Since the major source of information by far was the 
newspaper press, an attempt has been made, at the outset, to argue 
for the significance of local newspapers as legitimate voices of 
popular opinion. The hypothesis is that local papers 
simultaneously influenced and were influenced by the communities 
they served*
The study is divided into three parts* The first looks at 
the major issues: The English declaration of neutrality, the 
Northern blockade, and the question of European recognition*
The second traces the movement of attitudes from high optimism in 
the prospect of European intervention, through doubt, and then to 
the loss of hope. The third part examines the influence of 
"King Cotton" and the shift of attention from England as a 
potential ally to France.
INTRODUCTION
I share M.E. Massey's admiration for Frank Owsley's King 
Cotton Diplomacy, but also the view that Owsley failed to stress "the 
people's views, hopes, and disappointments."^ By researching the 
local newspapers from which the ordinary people presumably derived 
much of their information I hope that the emphasis will be on 
popular attitudes.
Eight newspapers were used for this study and they were 
selected on the basis of the following criteria: that they were 
available locally in reasonably continuous runs5 that they had good 
circulations; and that they represented a wide geographical and 
social range.
Three of the papers were published in Richmond, Virginia: the
Examiner, Enquirer, and Whig. This preponderance reflects the 
importance of the city as a centre of politics and communications;
New Orleans is represented by the New Orleans Bee and Alabama by the 
Mobile Register and Advertiser. Georgia's powerful cotton culture is 
represented by the Macon Daily Telegraph, the Columbus Daily Enquirer, 
and the Weekly Columbus Enquirer.
^"Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. Patrick, eds., Writing Southern 
History: Essays in Historiography in Honor of F.M. Green
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1965) p.260.
The vast majority of citations in this thesis are for 
newspapers published during the first two years of the war. This i
partly because, as I discuss later, the number of papers diminished 
greatly due to a shortage of materials, a disruption of 
communications, and closure following invasion. It also reflects, 
however, the level of Southern interest in Europe. This interest 
did not neatly follow either good or bad Confederate military 
fortunes in a kind of compensatory fashion. It followed a much 
simpler pattern. At the start of the war Confederate press
I
opinion was certain of European, especially British, involvement in 
the war in the interests of the cotton supply. So press interest i 
European attitudes was very high indeed. The Trent affair revived 
now flagging interest when it seemed that English pride, rather than 
economic self-interest, might again make intervention possible. 
Again, expectations were not realised. As the war dragged on the 
prospect of intervention diminished further. Without the hope of 
European involvement there was nothing in that far-off continent to 
arouse interest; it became un-newsworthy.
CHAPTER 1 
A FREEDOM ABUNDANTLY USED
The dangers of relying on newspapers for historical research
are well known: there are sometimes factual inaccuracies,
contradictions, partiality, editorial slanting and selection. As
E. Merton Coulter says, however, these cautions apply to news
reporting and not to editorial comment.^ Editorial opinion, by its
nature, cannot be inaccurate: it can only be to varying degrees
honest, intelligent, perceptive, independent, informed, and so on.
At the very least a study of such opinion will give the researcher a
summary of attitudes that were held by a number of influential people
in different parts of the country. But it may also be claimed that
those editors spoke not merely as individuals, but as spokesmen for a
far wider constituency. Such is the hypothesis on which the
following is based: that editors did in fact guide and form, but also
2
reflected, public opinion. In normal times it is the raison d'etre 
of journalists so to do. The relationship between newspapermen and 
the public was almost certainly sharper in a period of desperate danger 
and isolation, when the newspapers were virtually the only printed 
means of disseminating information.
^E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America,
1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1950), p.583.
2 iThis issue is raised by Eunice Wead, "British Public Opinion 
of the Peace with America in 1782, "American Historical 
Review, XXVI (April 1929), pp. 530-531.
That collectively newspapers played an important part in the
progress of the Civil War is almost beyond doubt. Coulter suggests
that their influence was so immense that the press had "almost within
3
its keeping the very destiny of the Confederacy." Charles S. Sydnor
acknowledges the "powerful influence" of the Richmond editors of the
Old South, and Harrison Trexler claims that the decline of
Confederate morale was to a significant degree the responsibility of
4
the Richmond press. Soon after the war, James Grant referred to
the "powerful influence" of the editors in his history of the
American p r e s s . T h e  sheer number of journals published in the
Southern states is a clue to their importance. This has been
estimated at something like eight hundred: country newspapers, the
church press, camp papers, broadsheets, literary publications and
6
magazines, and the newspaper press.
3
Coulter, p.505.
4
Harrison A. Trexler, "The Davis Administration and the 
Richmond Press." Journal of Southern History,
XVI (May 1950), p.195.
4
Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern 
Sectionalism, 1819-1848 (Louisiana State University Press, 
Louisiana Paperbacks 1968), p.228.
^James Grant, The Newspaper Press: Its Origins - Progress -
And Present Position, (2 Vols., London: Tinsley Bros., 1871),
Vol. 1, p.402.
Coulter, p.584. On country newspapers see Thomas D. Clark, 
"The Country Newspaper: A Factor in Southern Opinion
1865-1930," J.S.H. XIV (Feb. 1948), pp.3-33.
The special economic, political, geographical and cultural 
traditions of the South produced a newspaper press that was quite 
different from that of Europe, especially in two related respects.
It was free of government restriction and it was very diverse. The 
development of newspapers in Britain and France at the time of the 
Civil Was was mostly distinguished by government suspicion and control 
through censorship, libel laws, postal restrictions, and taxation.
It was not until 1861 that the newspaper duty on the English press 
was removed; in France the government’s attitude to the press was 
uncompromisingly restrictive.^ But, as Daniel Boorstin wrote, "the 
local variety and wide dispersion of the American newspaper press 
made it extraordinarily difficult for the government to control or 
restrict it .... Who could muzzle a newspaper press that was
g
diffused into every corner of a vast continent?"
The uncompromising distrust and hatred unleashed by the war was
not enough to let the government exercise control of the Southern
press. The dual tenets of editorial independence and freedom of the
press prevented it. As the Index, the Confederate newspaper
published in England, noted: "in the South the press is not only
9
free, but its freedom is abundantly used." President
Richard D. Altick, The English Common Reader: A Social
History of the Mass Reading Public, 1800-1900 (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), p.354.
g
Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The National Experience
(Weidenfield & Nicolson, Penguin, 1969), p.174.
^Index, 27 November, 1862.
7.
Jefferson Davis lamented with some cause a press that he thought 
partisan and venal.^
The Richmond Daily Examiner was relentlessly vitriolic in its 
attacks against Davis and the government, and many other Southern 
papers, the Macon Daily Telegraph for example, were highly critical 
of the government’s handling of the war effort. As Coulter wrote:
Added to the malignancy of the anti-Davis newspapers 
was an overzealous feeling for the freedom of the 
press —  the right to publish anything the editor 
chose —  and a lack of understanding of what might 
give aid and comfort to the enemy.11
Early in the war there were signs that the press would in some 
measure adopt what the government might have seen as a responsible 
attitude to war reporting. In June 1861 the Savannah Republican 
published a notice that was printed in other papers:
Notice to the Press —  We are requested by the military 
authorities of the Confederate States to urge upon our 
brethren of the press, throughout the South, the 
importance of abstaining from all specific allusions to 
the movement of troops. The very wisest plans of the 
government may be thwarted by an untimely or otherwise 
injudicious exposure.12
^Coulter, p.503; Trexler, p.195.
^Coulter, p.501.
12Quoted in Columbus Daily Enquirer, 13 June, 1861.
8.
But the government and military authorities did nothing to
encourage co-operation by making it easier for the press to report
the war. There was a lack of co-operation from the War Department,
13
the military commanders in the field, and the Postmaster General.
The newspapers were being forced to rely on the occasional official
report, leaks from army staff officers, and from Northern
newspapers. The Columbus Daily Enquirer asked for all "proper and
correct intelligence of the war" instead of forcing the press to
"accept accounts graciously permitted to be sent to us by the Federal 
14authorities." In addition to these restraints, in January 1862
the Confederate Congress considered passing a law that would make it
a crime to publish any news concerning military strengths or 
15
movements.
There was therefore a substantial division in attitude between 
the government and the press on how the war should be reported, with 
the result that the Federal government received military information 
from Confederate papers and civilian morale was in threat of being 
undermined. Nevertheless, the press believed deeply in the 
principle of press freedom and rigorously resisted any suggestions of
13Hoddmg Carter, Their Words Were Bullets; The Southern 
Press in War, Reconstruction and Peace (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1969), p.29; James W. Silver 
"Propaganda in the Confederacy," J.S.H., Xl (Nov. 1945), 
pp.487-503; Coulter, pp.336-337.
14Columbus Daily Enquirer, 13 June, 1861.
^Ibid., 22 January, 1862.
9.
government involvement. The Columbus Daily Enquirer sounded a 
warning against Congressional interference: "There is no necessity
to forfeit a particle of our freedom in carrying out this war ....
"16
Congress cannot be too cautious on a matter of such importance.
In response to General Beauregard's refusal to allow reporters 
within twenty-five miles of the lines, the Mobile Register gave its 
view of the importance of an independent press:
This is a war of opinion as well as arms. If our 
military Generals lead the soldiers of liberty to the 
cannon's mouth on the battlefield, it is the Generals 
of the Press who plan and fight the great moral battles 
of the revolution. The one deals in bayonets, bombshells, 
blood and sinews, and the other marshals the spirit of the 
revolution, inspires the courage and persuades to the [sic[ 
sacrifices of the people. The army could no more carry
on the war of independence without the press, than the
press could spare the army; and while the Chiefs of the 
Army upon the occurrence of every crisis acknowledge this 
position by their free use of its moral arms, they owe to
that co-operative power of the revolution, at least
respect and common justice.17
There were also other problems facing the press. Their teams
of reporters were inferior in size and organisation to those in the
North —  the "Bohemian Brigade" as one historian of the press called 
18them. The established news agencies of the North were of course
no longer available to Southern newspapers. Some attempt was made
X 6Columbus Daily Enquirer, 22 January, 1862.
^ Mobile Register & Advertiser, 29 May, 1862.
18Louis Starr, Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsmen in
Action (New York: Knopf, 1954), p.iii.
10.
to replace them after the Autumn of 1862: the Mutual Benefit Press,
an association of the four Richmond newspapers; the Confederate
Press Association; the Weekly Press Association of Georgia; and
the Press Association of the Confederate States. Their coverage of
the Confederacy was incomplete, however, and they were established 
19
too late. The basic job of newsgetting was therefore a
substantial problem for Southern editors. Quite late in the war,
the Macon Daily Telegraph responded to what they called "repeated
enquiries" about their sources for an article on foreign
intervention: "We claim to have none which are not open to every
20careful observer." But in January 1862 another editor was
equally honest in demystifying the news business:
Editors are currently presumed to possess a special fund 
of information ... and we, in common no doubt with most 
of our contemporaries, have been interrogated a thousand 
times ... as if our opinions were infallible. It is 
true that the press has opportunities of arriving at 
information in consequence of having access to numerous 
journals and correspondence, but, nevertheless, it is as 
subject to error as most individuals, and its conclusions 
are, therefore, not to be received with implicit trust.21
The near absence of informed government statements, the 
obstructions by the military, the inadequate reporting teams, were 
in a sense internal problems. To these must be added the 
accumulating effects of a defensive war; the manifold problems are 
described by Coulter:
19
Carter, pp. 32-33; Coulter, pp.496-97.
20Macon Daily Telegraph, 14 December, 1864.
21New Orleans Bee, 16 January, 1862.
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The volunteering editors, the lack of paper, the 
falling off of advertisements, the age-old difficulty 
of non-payment of subscriptions, poor postal service, 
the high cost of everything going into the making of 
a newspaper ....22
In many cases these problems resulted in closure, and these
occurred with perhaps surprising speed. During the first year of
the war forty papers closed in Virginia alone, and by the end of 1862
only about fourteen percent of newspapers remained in business.
North Carolina lost twenty-six papers; in Texas only ten out of
sixty remained after one year of war; the invasion of Mississippi
23forced the closure of sixty-six papers. Those that survived were
24drastically reduced in size. By the end of 1864 editorial morale
was at a very low ebb:
Everything is out of joint —  bridges are washed away, 
so that mails are interrupted, and letters and papers 
delayed, and wires are down, so that telegraphic 
communications are interrupted. The few papers 
received contain but little of general interest, while 
there is a complete dearth of news from the army.25
These various factors aggravated the problem, but Southern 
newspapers throughout the war had great difficulty in gathering 
information both for news items and editorials. The shortage of 
"hard” news forced editors often to rely on conjecture, supposition, 
and extrapolation. There was a tendency for editors to use phrases
22Coulter, p.493.
23Ibid.
24Index, 27 November, 1862; Starr, p.iii.
25Macon Daily Telegraph, 24 December, 1864.
such as: "There are some very numerous signs which indicate a
growing conviction "the English papers contain a good
deal to show that . ..."j information "said to be derived from
semi-official sources "information from a gentleman in
Paris observations from a "gentleman of the highest
reputation for talent and foresight ...." The rumour was rife.
Every newspaper reported them and often discussed them at length.
These comments are from a single edition: "We have rumours on
rumours —  so much smoke as seems certain to indicate fire ...."
The Canadian press "assures us that something is in the wind ...."
"The best informed correspondents of Northern papers state 
26that Towards the end of 1862 an Alabama paper explained
that the "public entertains with a lively interest every rumour ...
[and we] think it altogether proper to lay before our readers such
'straws' that float on the current, and to allow them to judge if
27they can, how the wind blows. By the end of 1864 even the rumours
were drying up as the invasion disrupted communications almost 
totally. The Macon Daily Telegraph complained of the unfavourable 
circumstances in which "we are deprived of all exchange papers except 
in our immediate neighbourhood from which to gather news, make 
selections, or catch an idea It went on:
2 6Mobile Register & Advertiser, 20 August, 1861. 
^Ibid., 7 November, 1862.
13.
the poor overtaxed editor is expected to furnish an 
interesting paper with each rising sun. He racks 
his brain for something wise and witty; he searches 
his few exchanges with eagerness, and runs his 
scissors remorselessly around any paragraph which 
promises to be of interest. He elaborates each 
startling rumour and wakes the interest of his readers 
with mysterious hints of wonderful events about to be 
developed. Those who hastily scan the columns of a 
daily paper in these times, little know the labour and 
anxiety it has cost in the preparation.28
Newspaper editorials in the mid-nineteenth century, as today, 
did not limit themselves to facts; they quite rightly dealt with 
ideas too. Nevertheless, the credibility of editorials must be
based on the presumption that they speak with authority, that they 
are the results of informed opinion, and that they have tapped 
sources of information not easily available to the reader. For 
editorials concerned with European affairs, these sources were almost 
exclusively other newspapers: Northern, Canadian, European. This
necessarily led to a reliance on the wider newspaper fraternity for 
news and opinion about the major Euro-American issues —  the blockade, 
recognition, intervention, cotton —  and led also to a kind of 
incestuous dialogue among newspapers. As suggested, this must have 
been at least in part the result of the dearth of alternative sources. 
It was also, it might be speculated, a reflection of the esteem felt 
within the fraternity for the standing and authority of the newspaper 
press generally. It seemed to be accepted implicitly that when a 
newspaper spoke, it spoke also for its readership.
28Macon Daily Telegraph, 3 December, 1864.
In America generally, the press was deeply established, from
the august papers of the seaboard states to the ’’booster press" in 
29
the West. But the South did not develop a metropolitan press
equivalent to, say, the New York Times or the Times of London.
Richmond, Virginia, with a population of roughly 38,000 in 1862 was
30
served by no less than five newspapers. Even in this major
Southern city it was therefore possible to develop a close 
relationship between the public and the highly visible and 
generally political editors.
These editors were a special breed: a kind of thuggish
literati. James Grant, the press historian writing in 1871,
pointed to a fundamental difference between the advocacy and
vigorous language of the English press, and the "violence, often
mingled with coarseness, in the tone and terms of the daily papers"
31in America. Even a cursory glance at the Southern editorials
makes clear what Grant meant. The Style is cavalier, provocative,
quarrelsome, and often irresponsible. The Index partly explained
the attitude: "In journalism, as in war, the attack has the
advantage over defence; it is easier, more pleasant, and generally
32more spirited and more effectual." The Southern people tended not
29Boorstin, pp.161-174.
30cStarr, p . v m .
31Grant, p.398.
32
Index, 27 November, 1862.
15.
to read books. The editors therefore reached their public
through rhetoric that reflected the hustings and the pulpit.
Hodding Carter put it this way:
The Southern editors for 150 years have been spokesmen, 
defenders, and firebrands in their regions to an extent 
not in evidence anywhere except perhaps the old West.
They have used their type fonts as bullets, their 
newsprint as musket wadding, their ink as gunpowder, 
and their words as tinder.34
Many of these men were sophisticated and influential,
respected within their communities and beyond. Charles Sydnor has
referred to the "distinguished and powerful Richmond editors" of the
1830’s and 1840's. Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer
before his death in 1854, was described in the Index as "the father
35of the Southern press." He was a political "nabob” who,
according to Bernard Weisberger, "was not only a power in the
legislative caucuses but a necessary part of every public meeting,
ball, banquet in Richmond .... Editor, citizen, and politician
36were at one with him." And so with the news of Fort Sumter; it
was not to the State capitol that the procession went with its
Confederate flags and torches, but to the Enquirer offices where the
37crowd was addressed by one of the editors. The Enquirer’s rival,
^Sydnor, p.306.
^Carter, p.l.
“^ Sydnor, p.228; Index, 27 November, 1862.
36Bernard A. Weisberger, The American Newspaperman 
(The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p.69.
37Alfred Hoyt Bill, The Beleagured City:Richmond 1861 
- 1865 (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p.39.
16.
the Examiner, had its editorial powerhouse in John Moncure Daniel,
described as "half genius, half misanthrope" who produced with his
editors, including Edward A. Pollard, a hard-hitting, erratic, and
38often fanatical newspaper. These Southern editors were not always
self-made entrepreneurs or grass-roots politicos. John Forsyth,
editor of the Mobile Register, apart from being a distinguished
newspaperman was a former minister to Mexico and representative in
39the Alabama legislature. Captain ObadiahWise, described by
Trexler as an "editorial personality" during his period with the
Enquirer was the son of a former governor of Virginia,
40Henry A. Wise. Another editor of the Enquirer, Jennings Wise,
studied at Heidelberg, was attached to the American legation in
41Berlin, and had bean secretary of the legation in Pans.
The newspapers produced by men like these varied in style and
quality. They included papers like the New Orleans Bee and the
Mobile Register which were moderate and balanced; the Richmond
Dispatch, a "popular" newspaper; the Examiner —  the Ishmael —  said
by the Index to be against everybody, "all parties, all men, and we
42may say, all measures." There were many hundreds more serving the
38
Trexler, p.181.
39Charles P. Cullop, Confederate Propaganda m  Europe, 
1861-1865 (Coral Gables; University of Miami, 1969), p.20.
40
Trexler, p.178.
41Bill, p.16.
^Index, 27 November, 1862.
17.
Confederacy, the smallest community as well as the cities. Every 
citizen had access to a paper of some kind, from the county 
weeklies to one of the plethora of dailies. The paper served not 
only the purchaser and the immediate family, but possibly changed 
hands and, through discussion, was transmitted orally to a wider 
public.
According to a contemporary observer, the editors were
43independent m  their opinions and free from vested interests.
They were also provincial. They were influenced by the communities
they served, and in turn sought to influence those communities: it
is a natural relationship in journalism. According to
Hodding Carter, the Southern press "demonstrated closer
identification with the aspirations of their regions than have those
44of any other part of the United States." And during this period 
when a monolithic issue dominated the Confederacy, when every area 
of life —  public, personal, social, economic —  was touched by it, 
the relationship between the press and the public must have been 
closer than in more normal times. The newspapers most often were 
the only means available to supply the public’s need for information, 
and it is the raison d'etre of journalists to pose the questions that 
their readership wants answered. Daniel Boorstin makes this point
43T.C. DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel'Capitals: An Inside
View of Life in the Southern Confederacy, from Birth 
To Death (Mobile, 1890), pp.288-89, quoted in Trexler, 
p.178.
44Carter, p.l.
18.
in the preface to Bernard Weisberger*s book on American
newspapermen s
The unexpected current of daily life define the 
newspaperman’s subjects for him .... (he] writes about 
the living and for the living .... [He] records the 
daily concerns of his age .... 45
During the Civil War the newspapers were, as might be 
expected, absorbed by the same issues. There were divergences of
views on specific problems. But they were united in the broadest 
sense, and as James Grant suggested in 1871, they had the power to 
affect public opinion in a direct way:
Public opinion, not only politically and morally, but 
socially, is powerfully influenced in all countries by 
the tone of their public journals. It is impossible 
it could be otherwise; for the community in every 
country must, however unconsciously, imbibe the spirit 
of the newspapers which they daily read.46
The Confederate press was far from elitist. It did not want to 
speak only for the civil and military worthies. In fact, far from 
it. Its voice was most often populist, critical of authority, 
impatient, cantankerous at times, and quick to react to events.
In these desperate times it was not always rational or consistent.
But the important point is that the newspapers were a part of a 
two-way process; the communication cycle was a complete one.
45Daniel Boorstin, Preface to The American Newspaperman, 
p.viii.
46
Grant, p.402.
19.
Hotze, Confederate propagandist and editor of the Index, subtly 
and succinctly summed up the influence of the press:
The Southern press ... is representative. It 
does not seek to make, but to feed and direct 
public opinion. Still, it is not a mere 
delegate, but exercises a controlling influence 
over that which gives it power and vitality.47
^Index, 27 November, 1862.
CHAPTER 11 
A STRICT AND IMPARTIAL NEUTRALITY
Britain’s wartime relationship with the Confederacy started on 
13 May, 1861 with Queen Victoria's Proclamation of Neutrality to 
Parliament, and became common knowledge a few days later when the 
Southern newspapers published the text:
whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced 
between the Government of the United States of 
America and certain States styling themselves the 
Confederate States of America ... we, being at 
peace with the Government of the United States, 
have declared our royal determination to maintain 
a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest 
between the said contending parties ....
Even as the Proclamation was being read, the Richmond Whig 
was preparing for print an editorial which claimed that "we may very 
safely look for recognition as soon as we want." And three days 
later, it expressed the view that England was preparing a "world of 
trouble for Old Abe and Seward," suggesting that direct government 
by "the amiable and accomplished lady who rules the British Empire" 
was not an impossibility.'*'
Britain's declaration of neutrality was followed by similar 
declarations from France, Spain, Russia, Brazil and the Netherlands.
^Richmond Whig, 13 May, 1861; ibid., 17 May, 1861.
21.
The web of interacting links and rivalries ensured a concerted
response to Britain's decision which itself was based on
realpolitik, made all the more solid because in this matter the
Conservative opposition was aligned with the Liberal government’s 
2
thinking. This alignment and, as James Baxter affirms, the logic
of national self-interest —  military, commercial, territorial —
3
ensured "the highest standards of neutral performance."
Therefore, a month after Sumter and two months before First 
Manassas the political and military reality of Europe's place in the 
Civil War had been firmly established. At least the European 
powers recognised "the self-evident fact of the existence of a war," 
Jefferson Davis wrote later. But, of course, the Confederates were 
greatly disappointed. As Jefferson Davis put it, "the neutral 
nations of Europe pursued a policy which, nominally impartial, was 
practically most favourable to our enemies and most detrimental to
The press were more direct in their language. English 
neutrality was, claimed the Whig, "tantamount to intervention in 
favour of the North" and that "British neutrality amount to an
2
Henry Blumenthal, "Confederate Diplomacy: Popular
Notions and International Realities," J .S .H . XXX11 
(1966), pp.166-167.
3
James Baxter, "The British Government and Neutral Rights," 
A.H.R. XXXIV (Oct. 1928), p.9.
4
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & Co.,
1881), 1:376,369.
22.
Anglo-Yankee alliance."'* This sentiment was expressed throughout 
the war. In May 1863 the Macon Daily Telegraph published an 
editorial that reflected a growing anger and frustration:
Of all the humbug, the greatest, undoubtedly, is 
English neutrality. The impudence and audacity 
with which the English Government and English 
writers have maintained, that they have held a strict 
neutral position in reference to the Federals and 
Confederates, have been remarkable even for the 
English hypocrisy.6
The anger lasted through to the end of the war when the 
Macon Daily Telegraph declared that Britain's objective was to 
"disable both sides , and to build up its own fortunes on their 
common ruin."^
It may not have been Britain's conscious policy to aid the 
North, but there were sound reasons for the South believing it to be 
so. Robert Huhn Jones in his work on Anglo-American relations 
states that "for better or worse," neutrality benefited the North,
g
and indeed Britain also. The Confederate press believed that the 
North exerted pressure on Britain: the Yankees got away with
interrupting British shipping "as if it were a Chinese junk;" they 
prevented Confederate ships being built in Britain; they were able
^Richmond Whig, 19 March, 1862; ibid., 19 April, 1862.
£
Macon Daily Telegraph, 14 May, 1863.
^Ibid., 7 April, 1865.
g
Robert Huhn Jones, "Anglo-American Relations, 1861-1865 
Reconsidered," Mid-America XIV (January, 1963), 
pp.36-49.
23.
9to recruit m  England and Ireland. It was claimed also that
although the Confederates had privateers, they were not, as was the 
North, allowed to use British colonial ports; and while the North 
was able to import from Britain openly, the South was not.^ The 
Richmond Whig offered a homily: British neutrality was only fine
words, but "fine words butter no parsnips."^ The Richmond Daily 
Examiner in an editorial dated 14 May 1862, went further in 
accusing Britain, and other European powers, of double standards and
of favouring the North even to their own disadvantage:
[while] ... permitting the South to be cut off from 
relations with jEurope] they have opened their 
armories, foundries and vast stores of military 
material to the Northern adversary. The result is 
now before them. The Southern navy has been 
annihilated .... Their jthe European powers*] maritime 
rival ... is without a competitor in American waters.
If those governments had observed the role of strict 
and absolute impartiality, giving the South the same 
facilities for procuring war materials .... the 
maritime interests of Europe would have had a 
powerful adjunct and support in American waters.
Therefore, to the extent that neutrality was an accepted fact
it was perceived as uneven in its application. It was not totally
accepted by the Southern press as a firm and unalterable policy.
Periodically the newspapers referred to neutrality as if surprised
that it actually existed. There seemed to be a feeling that it was
only a matter of time before the brutal reality of a cotton dearth
9
Macon Daily Telegraph, 14 May, 1863. 
^^Richmond Whig, 6 January, 1863. 
^Ibid., 19 April, 1862.
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would force Europe, and particularly England, into some kind of 
intervention. This is an understandable attitude since to believe 
firmly that Europe was permanently committed to neutrality as 
Britain had defined it was logically to accept the fact that there 
would be no recognition of independence nor a rejection of the 
blockade.
Blockading the Confederacy was the North’s first major 
strategic manoeuvre, and it was a psychological as well as an 
economic and military blow to the Confederacy. According to 
Gordon Wright, discussion of this issue was "woven through most-of 
the [French] consular reports during the war."^ Certainly the 
Confederate press was consumed with the blockade and placed the very 
highest priority on it being lifted. They did not see it in 
isolation; recognition was also a matter of the greatest concern. 
The blockade was a tangible matter and an affront, and that gave to 
it an immediacy that the perhaps more abstract political concept of 
recognition did not have. In any case, the press believed that if 
Europe could be induced to raise the blockade it would mean, ipso 
facto, that neutrality was at an end, and that the path was open to 
recognition.
The Confederate press believed that the blockade was illogical, 
illegal and ineffective. It was illogical because if it was true,
12 .Gordon Wright, "Economic Conditions m  the Confederacy
as Seen by the French Consuls," J.S.H. VII (May, 1941), 
p.198.
as the North claimed, that the Union was intact and therefore
Washington had jurisdiction over the South, then the Northern
13government was blockading its own ports. The blockade was
illegal by precedent: the New Orleans Bee made the point that both
the United States and Great Britain opposed the King of Naples when
he blockaded his ports during a rebellion. It was illegal also
because of precedents in international law: the Declaration of
Paris established the principle that a blockade would be binding
only if it were effective, and the South denied this to be the 
14
case. The press made much of their claim that the blockade was
ineffective because this was the real key to persuading the 
European nations to break it. They proffered an argument that 
sought to combine a call for justice with the prospect of practical 
advantage for Europe and the South. Because the blockade was 
ineffective, so went the argument, it was right that Europeans 
should judge it a "paper blockade" and therefore ignore it. By so 
doing, European shipping would enter Southern ports, thus further 
substantiating its ineffectiveness, deliver much needed goods, and 
collect cotton equally important for European industry. With the 
right incentive England would brush aside the blockade as though it 
were "a mere cobweb", claimed a Georgian planter.^
13Columbus Daily Enquirer, 30 December, 1861. See also 
Richmond Examiner, 22 August, 1861; New Orleans Bee, 
18 May, 1861, and 4 January, 1862.
14New Orleans Bee, 4 January, 1862.
15Columbus Enquirer, 12 June, 1861.
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During the opening months of the war, the Confederate press was
optimistic about the blockade. Much was made of the published
views of leading personalities such as Lord Grenville and Lord Lyon.
Lord John Russell was quoted as having said "distinctly and
emphatically" that the blockade had to be effective if it was to be
respected. Therefore, claimed the Richmond Whig, the "paper
blockade" which Seward proposed to establish would be treated with
X 6universal contempt. In the view of the Confederacy the very
extent of the task of blockading two thousand miles of coastline 
"with the numerous inlets from the James River to the Savannah" was 
nothing short of laughable.^
It was possible, however, for the Northern forces to blockade
specific ports at certain times. Therefore, when the British bark
Hiawatha was captured at the mouth of the River James the
Richmond Whig raised the question whether the blockade could be
18
effective if only part of the coast was closed.
Naturally, during the first months of the war the Southern 
press interpreted the cases of reported blockade busting as proof 
positive that the blockade was ineffective, and often they 
overstated the likely outcome. When the Alliance , another British
^ Richmond Whig, 25 May, 1861.
^ Richmond Daily Examiner, 13 August, 1861. 
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vessel, reached the port of Beaufort in North Carolina in
August 1861 "without let or hindrance" it was enough, without any
doubt, to declare that legally and practically the blockade ceased 
19
to exist. This kind of response was possible because it was
believed that if Europe knew that the blockade was ineffective such
a climate of unease and irritation would be created to ensure 
20intervention. According to the Richmond Daily Examiner the
result of such an intervention would be swift and total;
British merchants will immediately send to the 
Southern ports vessels laden with such stores as 
they may suppose most saleable in the country, and 
commissioned to bring back cargoes of tobacco and 
cotton. Should the government of the United 
States be mad enough to interfere with any one of 
them, ... the event will bring upon it the 
maritime force of the civilized world .... In a 
couple of months more we may, therefore, reasonably 
anticipate the re-opening of European commerce; and 
the consequence .,, can scarcely be too highly 
stated ....21
The "consequence" was expected to be a European attitude of 
"peace at any price." But this was the high point of King Cotton’s 
reign, during the first six months or so of 1861. Later in 1861 and 
in early 1862, the period of military reverses following First 
Manassas, the mood shifted from confidence to doubt. Specific 
cases of successful blockade running were reported, such as the
19Richmond Examiner, 30 August, 1861.
20New Orleans Bee, 18 May, 1861; Richmond Whig, 
1 August, 1861.
21Richmond Examiner, 30 August, 1861.
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"Bermuda” at Savannah in November 1861, and newspapers like the 
New Orleans Bee and the Richmond Whig drew on "accurate
22statistics" to report five hundred cases of blockade busting.
But the so called "paper blockade" remained. The Columbus Enquirer
became introspective: "We boast that ’Cotton is King’ but an
inefficient and feeble blockade now strips this commercial monarch
23of his power ...." The New Orleans Bee looked outwards:
The blockade is notoriously ineffective and illegal, 
and as such is not entitled to the respect of 
Neutral powers .... We cannot possibly believe that 
the principal nations of Europe will much longer 
brook so insufferable a wrong, and so vital an 
injury to their commerce.24
In July 1861, the Columbus Daily Enquirer expressed a common 
sentiment that can best be described as an optimism blended with 
sharp political realism. The raising of the blockade was 
inevitable. The economic collapse of the cotton trade would bring 
pressure on the French and especially the British. The "simple 
question" for these governments to ponder was:
whether they will soonest procure the freedom of the 
cotton trade in permitting the United States speedily 
to crush the Southern ’rebellion’ or by assisting the 
Southerners to raise the blockade.25
22New Orleans Bee, 15 November, 1861 and 17 February, 1862.
23Columbus Enquirer, 7 November, 1861.
24New Orleans Bee, 31 December, 1861.
25Columbus Enquirer, 8 July, 1861.
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The frequent demand for justice, either in international law or 
by some ill-defined standard of morality, was little more than 
rhetoric. What really underpinned the confidence of the 
Confederate press was a belief in the power of mutual interest:
They want our staple, we want theirs [manufactured 
products^. They have command of the ocean —  they 
can break Lincoln's blockade in twenty-four hours, 
let them do it.26
This notion was not quite as starkly put as that of King Cotton,
but it was only a step away. The tone of the press suggested
incredulity, and England and France rather than the Confederacy were
placed in the role of victims. The blockade was described as a
"pistol at the breasts of ten million Frenchmen and Englishmen."
The North, it was claimed, was in "covert war" against the
European powers. It was therefore "probable" that Mfor their own
interest and necessities" England and France would raise the 
27
blockade. The Richmond Whig asked:
How long under the inexorable pressure of events will 
England maintain her present tone of moderation?
Will it be when her tobacco revenue is extinguished 
and Lancashire cries aloud for cotton, or will her 
policy now be what it ever has been from the consolara 
del mare, down to the present hour, to measure her 
regard for maritime law precisely by the exigencies of 
her commercial position.28
2 6
Richmond Whig, 20 May, 1861.
27Richmond Examiner, 12 July, 1861, 13 July, 1861; New 
Orleans Bee, 24 August, 1861.
28
Richmond Whig, 21 June, 1861.
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By the winter of 1861— 62 the newspapers were publishing more
widely the view that Europe was unlikely to risk war with the North
over the blockade. In a number of articles beginning in December
1861 the Macon Daily Telegraph questioned the assumption that
Europe would intervene to break the blockade, until in
February 1862 it admitted that "we ought now finally dismiss the
29idea of having the blockade broken this spring." In November 1861
the New Orleans Bee expressed a growing disillusionment, and perhaps 
maturity: The South should
defeat the enemy and raise the blockade ... without 
the slightest reference to the policy of foreign 
nations. We have already dallied too much with 
precious time, in the childish hope that Europe would 
loose the Gordian knot which it is our business to 
cut with the sword.30
29Macon Daily Telegraph, 5 December, 1861; 15 February, 1862.
30New Orleans Bee, 26 November, 1861.
CHAPTER 111 
THE FRAGILE OPTIMISM
Repudiation of the blockade, and therefore rejection of 
neutrality as the British had defined it, was one way the South 
hoped Europe might intervene in the Civil War. There were others: 
recognition of Southern independence, mediation for a favourable end 
to hostilities, and, most extreme, armed intervention on behalf of 
the Confederacy. One diplomatic initiative, not actively sought by 
the Southern press, was the belligerent status declared by Britain 
and France in May 1861. This caused little interest in the press 
for the good reason, pointed out by E. Merton Coulter, that it 
amounted to "nothing more than recognition that a war rather than a 
street fight was in progress and that the rules of war were now in 
effect
The Trent affair probably more than any other single event gave 
justification for the belief that Britain would end her neutrality 
and in some way assist the Confederacy, most likely by declaring war
^Coulter, p.187.
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2
against the Union. In this, as in other moments of high hopes, 
the Confederate press expressed a fragile optimism that did not 
easily survive the stress of changing circumstances.
The Trent affair was, said the Macon Daily Telegraph, the
North's "maddest prank" and for which Britain was bound to demand
redress. The Columbus Daily Enquirer had, it claimed, despaired
that Britain would ever interfere with the blockade but believed
that she could not "submit to this act of the Lincoln government."
It was, said the Richmond Enquirer, "impossible for the English
government, without disgrace, to fail to enact the fullest 
3
reparation." And the New Orleans Bee which on the whole gave the
most sophisticated analysis of the crisis, believed, at least in the
early days, that Britain would "demand prompt and complete
reparation, in default of which she will be ready to launch the
4
thunderbolts of war."
The Trent affair was the incident in which the ship 
carrying Jefferson Davis' commissioners, James Mason and 
John Slidell, who were bound for Europe to argue the 
Confederate cause, was stopped by the Union warship San 
Jacinto and the commissioners arrested. The incident was 
known by the name of the British ship, Trent.
3
Macon Daily Telegraph, 19 December, 1861; Columbus 
Enquirer, 19 November, 1861; Richmond Enquirer,
19 November, 1861.
4
New Orleans Bee, 27 November, 1861.
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All the newspapers used the rhetoric of war, seeking to give 
the British a reason for joining the hostilities: the capture of a
British ship was an insult to British honour, it showed disrespect 
for the British flag, it was a profound indignity, and it was an 
offence against international law. An enthusiastic editorial in 
the Richmond Enquirer sums up the tenor of the press during this 
period:
We rejoice that it was put into the minds of Wilkes 
to insult the British flag .... And we rejoice that 
John Bull has put down his head and levelled his 
horns. We rejoice to hear the roar of the English 
Lion in an honest cause.5
There was also a balanced and thoughtful side to Confederate 
journalism. This was to be found in, among others, the 
Columbus Enquirer. It pointed out that Britain would not act out 
of a hysterical sense of battered pride. If it was in her interest
to make war against the North she would do so and neither
international law nor "old foggy precepts or learned dissertations
£
would stand in her way." The New Orleans Bee took the view that 
although Britain had suffered "a most gross and shameful indignity" 
she was foremost a "political nation" and before taking action would 
have to be convinced that the stability of her government or the 
welfare of her people were threatened. The Trent affair merely
^Richmond Enquirer, 20 December, 1861.
Columbus Enquirer, 25 November, 1861, 20 December, 1861.
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offered a "justifiable pretext*' should Britain want to raise the 
blockade, and on the whole this was thought unlikely.^
The attitude and response of the North was of course the 
crucial factor in the outcome of the affair. The Richmond Examiner 
expressed the view that **the North is furious for war with England.
The British Lion is to be subdued; John Bull has now found his
g
match; the mission of the United States is to put him down." A 
week later the paper had modified its position to one that was more 
widely held in the press:
Alas! We are forced to the painful confession, that
amid all their lunacy, and in the midst of their
wildest frenzy, the Northern nation have steadily and 
consistently preserved untouched one trait of their 
ordinary character and natural disposition. It is 
their cowardice. Sane or mad, drunk or sober, they 
are always the same pusillanimous poltroons.9
Neither Britain nor the North wanted confrontation. The 
Confederate press expressed a bitter disappointment in an avalanche 
of invective. The North had given an "infamous and unconditional 
apology**; it was the "most ignominious back-down ever perpetrated 
by any nation of respectable power"; the Union was guilty of 
"fawning sycophancy" and“miserable cowardice"; it had suffered a 
deep "humiliation."^ The New Orleans Bee ranted:
^New Orleans Bee, 20 November, 1861, 4 December, 1861.
g
Richmond Examiner, 20 December, 1861.
9
Ibid., 27 December, 1861.
"^Richmond Whig, 4 January, 1862; Macon Daily Telegraph, 
27 December, 1861; New Orleans Bee, 4 February, 1862.
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when the British Lion growled and showed his 
teeth, we expected that the Yankee jackle would put 
his tail between his legs, lower his crest and lick 
the dust in abject humility, and this is exactly 
what he has done.11
The outcome of the Trent affair weakened the prospect of
British interference with the blockade. The earlier optimism of
the Confederate press was based in the belief that Britain needed
the cotton supply at any cost, and this proved to be untrue. The
press responded in three ways. The weakest response was to suggest
that the European powers might yet raise the blockade. Another was
to urge retribution through a refusal to plant new cotton crops and
destroy stocks. Two motives governed the latter response.
Firstly, the psychological need to strike out at Europe: ’’Why
should our people insanely plant cotton? The blockade is upon us,
fixed and fastened for an indefinite length of time. Intervention
by Foreign States is dead, if it ever had any vitality." Secondly,
as a possible shock that "might startle France and England from their
apathy," through knowledge that "not a single bale of cotton or a
pound of tobacco will be allowed to leave Southern ports for Europe
until those ports are open to the commerce of nations by the
12raising of the blockade." The third reason for the press response
~^New Orleans Bee, 3 January, 1862.
^^Macon Daily Telegraph, 26 February, 1862; New Orleans 
Bee, 13 March, 1862.
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was allied to the last, but it encouraged the South to continue the 
war without foreign assistance:
It has taken much time and many pregnant facts to 
convince our countrymen that they must win their own 
battles .... Not without many a fond and lingering 
look across the Atlantic have they slowly and 
reluctantly abandoned the once sanguine hopes of a 
speedy interference.13
The government and the Confederate press placed a great store 
on British recognition, and a vast number of editorials 
concentrated attention on the question. Undoubtedly the advantages 
to the Confederacy would have been enormous. Diplomatic channels 
would have opened and, as Coulter points out, the trading and
14commercial opportunities would have been of "inestimable value."
But the press seemed to put comparatively little importance on these 
effects, tending to emphasize the psychological advantages:
It will be nothing less than the deliberate and 
solemn judgement of the nations according it, that 
the Confederate States are, and of right ought to 
be, free, sovereign and independent- - that they 
cannot be subjugated— and that the war ought to 
[cease). Such action by England and France and 
the other chief powers, foreshadowed by an almost 
unanimous popular sentiment ... would confront 
our enemy with the public opinion of the world.15
13New Orleans Bee, 2 April, 1862.
14Coulter, pp.188-89.
15Richmond Whig, 6 August, 1862.
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The positive conviction that recognition would be achieved was
energetically held, although short lived, and it was held partly
from a sense of desperations "There is no possible compromise, no
alternative between our extermination, and our recognition as a free
X 6and sovereign nation." The British and French press, although
unpredictable in their support, were a source of much comfort to
those in the South. The early military successes during the
Peninsular Campaign added to the sense of optimism. To quote the
Macon Daily Telegraph of 7 July 1862s "The Battle of Richmond, will
remove the least doubt of our ability to maintain ourselves, and
Europe will wait on the Lincolnites no longer for c o t t o n . A n d
the belief in cotton itself gave strength: "We can ... very safely
rely on our impregnable position —  on the command of which our
products hold over the vital interests of the British Empire, for as
18speedy a recognition as we may desire." By August 1861 the mood
was set:
We ask no aid to handle this rampant fanaticism of the 
North; single handed we can subdue and shackle it in 
its confines beyond the Mason and Dixon's line; by the 
sword we can win and hold our independence, and now that 
we have shown that we can do so, we may demand our 
recognition of foreign powers as their equals among 
nations, not as the dependents of their magnanimity.19
^ New Orleans Bee, 27 June, 1861.
^ Macon Daily Telegraph, 7 July, 1862. 
18
Richmond Whig, 23 May, 1861.
19Mobile Register, 20 August, 1861.
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Blumenthal calls this "the period of 'sanguine expectations'"
20which is apt indeed. By the winter of 1861-62 there was,
however, the start of a discernible shift away from complete 
optimism towards doubt, and with that an antagonism towards Britain 
that at times was brutal in its force and vitriolic in its language. 
The Mobile Register asked in February 1862:
Why has she not recognised us? Why has she, an eminently 
selfish power in her policy, resisted every inducement 
of interest, every incitement of passion stimulated by the 
hostile deportment of the North, and thus long refused to 
us a common right and justice ....?
In answer to this rhetorical question, the issue of slavery was
brought into the open: "It is because we are a 'peculiar people' —
peculiar as the Israelites were of old among the surrounding 
21
Gentiles." The Mobile Register thundered against the "government 
of Great Britain, and the sickly sentimental cant of abolitionism." 
"Exeter Hallism is triumphant" it claimed, with reference to the 
British abolitionist movement in England. Palmerston was berated: 
"The terrible filthy thing of slavery comes betwixt the wind and the 
gentility of my Lord ... when he is obliged to approach the 
South ...." The editorial went on:
Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American 
Relations, 1830-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1959), p.158.
21Mobile Register, 2 February, 1862.
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We may expect no favour, not even right. We are 
a ’peculiar people' —  a slaveocracy, beyond the
pale of human sympathies .... There is no help
for us but in our own might and the favour of 
heaven .... Let us shut our eyes to all the 
outside world, and fight out our destiny without 
looking beyond the points of our bayonets. If 
the rest of the world will have nothing to do with 
us, let us have nothing to do with it ....22
By the summer of 1862 a tired resignation seemed to weigh on
the Southern press. In June the Richmond Examiner went so far as to
say: ’’Recognition of a government that is struggling in the agonies
23of death is a diplomatic impossibility.” The next month the
Columbus Daily Enquirer summed up this new feeling:
Human governments are not institutions of benevolence 
.... They care very little about the interests of 
each other .... All the complaints, therefore, about 
the tardiness of England and France to recognise the 
independence of the South, are mere reflections of the 
world we live in.24
By the autumn of 1862 there was little optimism left. The press 
looked for a "cogent” reason why Britain would recognise the 
Confederacy, and none was forthcoming. At about this time the 
Southern press began to consider more closely the position of France. 
In a sense this was understandable. Napoleon had made clear his 
wish to recognise the Confederacy, and the Confederate commissioners 
received a much warmer welcome in Paris than in London. But to turn
22Ibid., 11 March, 1862.
23Richmond Examiner, 17 June, 1862.
24Columbus Daily Enquirer, 17 July, 1862.
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to France at this time must have been more symbolic as a rejection
of Britain than a realistic expectation of French action, since it
had been made absolutely clear that France would recognise the
Confederacy only if Britain acted first. Even when Slidell offered
the French major trading advantages, including free cotton,
25Napoleon dared not act alone.
The Confederate press understood the political situation in
Europe and realised there were major problems in the way of a
favourable response, although it was not often stated explicitly.
It was implicit, however, in the strategy they adopted towards
Napoleon: a mixture of flattery and enticement. Napoleon was now
referred to as "sagacious,** "clear headed", and ‘Imtethered" by
ideology. He could readily be "brought to see the immense
advantages, which could be accrued to France from a close and
26
exclusive commercial alliance with the Southern States.*'
From the spring of 1862 through the following winter, this 
complex balancing of attitudes continued towards, on the one hand, a 
discredited Britain whose support was still begrudgingly sought and, 
on the other, to France which was viewed, despite the rhetoric, very 
much as a less attractive prospect. The final stage was when 
France too was found wanting, and the accusing finger was pointed at 
the whole map of Europe.
^Coulter, pp.185-190.
2 6Richmond Whig, 5 February, 1862.
The rationale for expecting French assistance was based on two 
factors: first, that the special commercial relationship would save
the French clothing industry and, second, that Napoleon’s adventure 
in Mexico would be strengthened if he had a friendly ally as a
neighbour. On that basis, the Mobile Register looked forward, as it
27obliquely put it, to ’’early and important revelations from abroad.” 
The Columbus Enquirer cautioned its readers not to "overestimate the 
value of recognition by such a power as France” while accepting the
28fact that there would be enormous advantages should it be achieved. 
Britain and other European powers might follow with recognition.
The confidence of the South would be greatly enhanced, as the North's 
would be diminished. The North's threat that war would follow 
recognition would be tested and found empty.
During the autumn of 1862, however, the press seemed to believe
that European assistance was improbable. Consolation was now
offered: non-recognition at least meant there were no obligations
29which the South would have to honour in the future.
The presence of British consuls accredited to the United States 
and still in the South became acutely irritating, and virtually all 
the press favoured their expulsion. The period of greatest concern 
was the summer of 1863. Later in that same summer and early in the
27Mobile Register, 18 April, 1862.
28Weekly Columbus Enquirer, 24 June, 1862.
29Columbus Enquirer, 13 September, 1862.
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autumn the very much more serious issue emerged when the Confederate
Commissioner to England was treated with coolness by Lord Palmerston:
"It must be a source of bitter humiliation to every Southern heart
to contemplate the spectacle of a Southern Commissioner, hat in
hand, obsequiously begging English abolitionists to recognise the
30Southern Confederacy." The Mobile Register summed up nicely the
attitude now widely held by the Southern press: "We have happily
done with Old England as well as New England, and neither expect nor
31
ask nor require recognition from one or the other."
A very low point had been reached in the Confederate editor^1 
relations with Britain. The press believed that the Confederacy 
had suffered a massive diplomatic failure over the issue of 
recognition; the apparently off-hand treatment of their commissioner 
only served to deepen the resentment. The enormous military 
disasters of Gettysburg and Vicksburg added to the feelings of 
despair. Since Britain, far more than France, was blamed for 
prolonging the war it is not surprising that the press spared no 
quarter in condemning a nation that had, to all intent and purpose, 
become an enemy.
The Richmond Whig was the most consistent and aggressive critic 
of Britain during this period. Of the many editorials, one
30
Richmond Whig, 3 August, 1863.
31Mobile Register, 21 October, 1863.
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published in July 1863 expressed the anger best. Far from 
wishing the war would end, Britain wanted it to continue for as long 
as possible.
They gave no place to consideration of humanity, 
of chivalry, of kindred blood. They are governed 
solely by the cold, callous and calculating policy 
of self-advantage. Blood and tears may flow in 
torrents; roofs that cover sleeping women and 
children may flame from the brand of the 
incendiary; famine may gnaw at the hearts of the 
innocent and helpless; the demonized slave may be 
fired to acts of unmentionable horror —  what cares 
the great Christian nation of Great Britain for all 
this! It is in her interest that the terrible 
work should go on! The speaking of a word might 
end it all, and because it might she will not speak 
the word .... 32
In editorial after editorial the anti-British message was 
relentlessly restated and, as if to intensify the attacks, the 
French were elevated to a sublime and, given the French political 
and military ambitions, absurd level of purity and good intent. 
Thus, in juxtaposition to Britain’s self-interest was placed French 
virtue:
The Emperor of the French, whose heart is yet 
capable of human sensibility, and can be touched 
as well by sympathy with manly suffering as by 
admiration for heroic conduct —  who thinks it 
would be 'a shame to the civilization of the age' 
to stand idly by, when such inhumanities are 
going on and when a gallant and proud race, fighting 
only for what is their own right of birth, have made 
good in the face of the world their claim to 
independence —  desires to end the wholesale butchery 
of human beings, and to receive into the family of 
nations a people whose manhood has been so nobly 
asserted.33
"^Richmond Whig, 31 July, 1863.
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From late summer 1863, for reasons mentioned in the first
34chapter, newspapers published less copy. This practical
situation combined with a lessening interest in foreign intervention
as a practicable notion meant greatly fewer references in what
remained of the Southern press about foreign involvement in the war.
A limp suggestion that France might yet recognise the Confederacy as
a part of the Mexican "adventure*' was made at the end of 1864 by the
Macon Daily Telegraph, one of the few Confederate papers still
publishing. But it was a "feeble ray" that started as a rumour and
35was third-hand by the time it was published by the Telegraph. The
Richmond Examiner published what must have been one of the final 
statements, reprinted in the Mobile Register in March 1865, which 
stated that Europe as a whole had let down the Confederacy:
Foreign nations have been without emotion [in] this 
irrepressible conflict forced upon us, and without 
intervention have permitted it to be carried on in 
violation of the usages of civilized warfare for 
four years. Other nations have been recognised by 
them upon far less evidence of capacity to maintain 
their independence than we have exhibited —  nations 
possessing fewer of the elements of national greatness 
that we possess —  and yet, to this day, our 
independence is not recognised.36
Mediation was from time to time seriously considered both by 
Britain and France and, according to Henry Blumenthal, the 
Confederate government became increasingly interested as the war
^ S e e  pp.10-11.
35
Macon Daily Telegraph, 28 December, 1864.
36Reprinted in Mobile Register, 20 March, 1865.
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37seemed to drag endlessly on. This interest was not reflected m
the press, although it was discussed during the lean period in
Confederate fortunes in the spring of 1862. However, the attitudes
varied from caution to outright opposition. It was felt to be more
a matter for foreign governments to dwell on than for the combatants.
The timing was for foreigners to decide, and the rules were theirs
also. For the Southerner, mediation implied stalemate which they
would not want to admit. It implied compromise, to which the
Richmond Whig had "but one answer —  eternal opposition. No
compromise, no peace, until every foot of territory south of Mason
3 8and Dixon's line is abandoned by the Yankees ...."
The popular feelings about foreign involvement in the war 
followed three chronological, although necessarily overlapping, 
stages. The first was a state of high optimism which lasted from 
the outset of war through the summer of 1861; the second was the 
search for an explanation as to why there was no involvement, 
especially recognition, which lasted from the summer of 1861 to 
about the end of 1862; the final stage was the realisation, taking 
different forms, that Europe would not get involved.
37Blumenthal, Confederate Diplomacy, pp.158-159.
38
Richmond Whig, 28 March, 1862; Richmond Examiner,
17 April, 1862.
CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT CONTROLLING CONSIDERATION OF SELF-INTEREST
"King Cotton" was not an inappropriate term for a staple crop 
that could dominate a culture in the way that cotton did in the 
South. It was the essence of the political economy. More than 
this, Southerners believed that cotton supported the economies of 
the major European nations, especially Britain, and that it was 
therefore a crucial factor in maintaining social and political 
stability. The tragic miscalculation was the belief that the 
power of "King Cotton" could mould international affairs; that, 
when the chips were down, Europe could be cajoled, bribed or bullied 
into actively supporting the Confederacy.
This attitude has been criticised, with justification, by
historians as "naive", "preposterous", "ludicrous", and so on.^
Nevertheless, cotton was enormously important to the British
economy. As Cullop points out, textiles were England’s most
important industry, and the South supplied eighty per cent of the
2
cotton needed to sustain it. Furthermore, a glance at the English
Cullop, Confederate Propaganda, p.135.
Edward Albert Pollard, The Lost Cause; A New Southern 
History of the War of the Confederacy (New York: E.B.
Treat & Co., 1867), pp.130-131.
2
Cullop, p.11.
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press of the period will indicate that this attitude was as firmly-
held by the English as the Southerners. As Owsley said, it was
•'the English leaders themselves who contributed most to convincing
the Southern people that England's very existence seemed to depend
3
upon the cotton of the South. Every Southern newspaper time and 
again quoted from English papers to indicate that the cotton dearth 
was cutting deep. In the New Orleans Bee of 22 October 1862 the 
leader headline was "THE DISTRESS IN ENGLAND**, and this opening 
paragraph was typical of newspaper opinion:
The latest accounts received from England show that 
the distress in the cotton districts continue to 
increase, from week to week. Day after day mills 
have been shortening the time for which they kept at 
work; and although not so frequently, yet with 
consistency, others were closing altogether.
The Southern press quoted freely from a wealth of English 
papers all of which gave substance to the *'King Cotton** philosophy: 
as one English newspaper claimed, the alternative colonial source 
of cotton, India, would not help replace American cotton:
before the cotton of India could be got or the 
machinery prepared for its manufacture, the 
probabilities are, that we should have no mills to 
refit, no operatives to employ, no commerce to 
sacrifice and no country to save .... Why should 
they [the English workers^ see their wives in rags, 
their children famished, their cupboard empty, their 
grates fireless, their homes denuded of every article 
of furniture, themselves pressed into pauperism or 
coerced into crime, because the mad mean government 
of the Northern States has committed itself to one of 
the most foolish and wicked wars ever waged by one 
power against another ...?4
3
Owsley, p.12.
4
Quoted in Columbus Weekly Enquirer, 17 January, 1862.
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The belief in "King Cotton", well established by the 
beginning of the war, was unshaken by news of abundant stockpiles 
of cotton in the warehouses of England’s northern ports. In 
July 1861 the Richmond Whig acknowledged that England had Va large 
supply of cotton snug and safe in her warehouses":
But just wait a while, and let these warehouses 
become empty —  the cotton spun up and sold —  and 
then, should the Southern ports still be blockaded, 
we shall see the word ’neutrality’ banished from her 
vocabulary, and the way and means devised for a 
replenishing of stocks, and the consequent resumption 
of the mills that may have been temporarily closed.5
The Mobile Register took much the same line during the first 
summer of the war. They anticipated the day when England and 
France, and also Spain, Belgium, Russia, Switzerland "and a dozen 
other countries” would find the "last bale gone."
The busy hum of {the] factory will cease, its doors 
be closed and its operatives scattered, knowing not 
where to find a loaf of bread. Eight or nine 
millions of people —  white population equal to the 
whole population of this vast and unconquerable 
confederacy —  will be turned out in a starving 
condition, the cries for bread of each man, woman 
and child of them, a solemn protest of humanity to 
Heaven against Abraham Lincoln and his compeers ....
A short time, and we will learn what really is the 
power of the cotton lever. We will learn if it has 
strength to move the world. We will see if the 
governments of Europe will turn a deaf ear to the 
appealing cries of starving millions of the foreign 
subjects of King Cotton .... England, Europe, 
cannot afford to wait for the Confederacy to conquer 
a peace. The spindles and the looms are working 
out the defeat of the North and our independence ....6
^Richmond Whig, 9 July, 1861.
6Mobile Register, 11 August, 1861.
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The basic message and the emotional pitch of the above is 
typical of publications both in the South and in England. Pollard 
was certainly right when he wrote with hindsight in 1867 that it was 
absurd to expect that England would act as if her empire depended 
on "a single article of trade that was grown in A m e r i c a . B u t  it 
would be wrong to assume that Southerners were out of step with the 
received wisdom of the time.
In any event, this implicit, uncritical, and essentially 
passive trust in "King Cotton" was short lived. As late as the 
summer of 1863 the Richmond Whig could write: "In spite of all
disappointments and doubts, Cotton jls King, if we had the nerve and
g
pluck enough to crown and proclaim him such ...." But this
became an exception. From the summer of 1861 the press called for
action that would support the influence of cotton. Higher prices
should be paid for commodities brought through the blockade, a
remission should be applied to all duties against imports, a
remission also on port and city charges, and Confederate purchase
of steamers that were capable of running the blockade. There was
growing support for voluntary crop destruction in order "to startle
France and England from their apathy"; wherever the enemy has
penetrated, claimed the Whig "the cotton has been cheerfully given
9
as a holocaust on the altar of liberty."
^Pollard, The Lost Cause, pp.130-131.
g
Richmond Whig, 23 June, 1863.
9
Columbus Daily Enquirer, 29 July, 1861; New Orleans Bee, 
13 March, 1862; Ibid., 27 July, 1861; Richmond Whig,
17 June, 1862.
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Therefore, during the first six months or so of the war, the 
Southern press emphasised a fairly simplistic version of the ’’King 
Cotton’* philosophy: economic ruin for manufacturing and related
industries; the pauperisation of massive numbers of operatives and 
their dependents throughout Europe, and especially England and 
France; either revolution or, more likely, successful pressure on 
European governments to open up the cotton supply through some form 
of intervention. This was not, however, the whole story. Later, 
when it was clear to all but the most stubborn that Europe was not 
going to intervene for the sake of a cotton supply, attempts were 
made to understand more fully the complexity of European interests. 
Even as early as the autumn of 1861 there developed from the passive
confidence in "King Cotton" an equally important strain of thought
that questioned its logic. This doubt, and sometimes outright 
rejection, of "King Cotton" continued to the end of the war, 
gathering strength as time passed and Confederate fortunes changes.
The Macon Daily Telegraph was the most consistent opponent of 
the "King Cotton" philosophy and the only paper which never really 
believed it. In one of its last publications, in March 1865, it 
wrote an apt epitaph:
'No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power
on earth dares to do it. Cotton is King.' This
sounds very absurd now, but how many of us believed 
all this four years ago - - and a thousand kindred 
fallacies.10
^Macon Daily Telegraph, 22 March, 1865.
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As early as 1861, the Macon Daily Telegraph had opposed
Confederate reliance on "King Cotton” as a weapon because it acted
against the interests of free trade. The chief practical argument
against restricting the cultivation of cotton, destroying existing
crops, or using cotton as a bargaining weapon was that it would
stimulate foreign production of cotton or encourage the
development of cotton substitutes. Free trade, on the other hand,
would cultivate a "mutuality of interest —  a bond of ...
f r i e n d s h i p . I t  would improve greatly the supply of much needed
European merchandise since payment for cotton would be in goods
rather than the more risky transportation of precious metal.
Merchandise and, even more important, food was the top priority.
The New Orleans Bee, in October 1861, called on cotton to yield its
12crown for "those higher claimants to authority —  bread and meat."
In February 1862 the Macon Daily Telegraph declared:
Let us prepare for the struggle. Let the very
crows in the field caw in scorn at the folly of the 
planter who bothers himself about planting cotton 
this spring. In God's name let us have food cheaper 
and plentier, or give up the ship .... Will any 
planter of common sense tell us what the army will do 
—  what the people are to do unless ten times more 
corn and meat is raised at home?13
By the beginning of 1862 there was wide disillusionment with 
"King Cotton". The newspapers, Confederate and European, 
continued to publish reports on the distress in the cotton districts
"^Ibid., 9 October, 1861.
12New Orleans Bee, 14 October, 1861.
13Macon Daily Telegraph, 15 February, 1862.
of England, the risk of revolution, and governments' inhumanity in
the face of the peoples' suffering. But the European governments
seemed to be unaffected. Some months earlier the Macon Daily
Telegraph noted this: "We regret to see the composure and
resignation with which the British public are evidently preparing
to accept the loss of Southern cotton ... as an unavoidable 
14misfortune." A new sombre orthodoxy developed during 1863: "We
...have attached entirely too much importance to the influence of 
the cotton question .... This has proved a serious error.";
"One principal ground of miscalculation ... has been the idea that 
Cotton is King."; "Bitter lessons" have reversed the belief in that 
"good old tune."; "The silly idea of cotton politicians ... is about 
to expire even in the brains which could hold but that one idea."^ 
In November 1861 the Columbus Daily Enquirer had made the point:
The great truth is that Commerce has no King, it 
is a democracy, in which the poorest commodity of 
today may rise to the highest rank tomorrow ....
Until we have such diversity of interests and 
pursuits that we can establish and maintain a home 
value for our leading products, they will ever be 
subject to vicissitudes such as we have witnessed 
within the last twelve months.16
14Macon Daily Telegraph, 23 October, 1861.
"^*New Orleans Bee, 4 March, 1862; Columbus Daily Telegraph, 
25 March, 1862; Mobile Daily Advertiser, 19 April, 1862; 
Richmond Examiner, 20 August, 1862.
16Columbus Daily Telegraph, 7 November, 1861.
The early support for England was not an expression of
friendliness. England had the military might to take on the North,
and she was thought to be the most vulnerable to "King Cotton"
diplomacy. When it became clear that England would not easily be
influenced by enticement or threat of cotton diplomacy the
Confederate press became openly aggressive. There was not, to
begin with, any evidence in the Southern press of the feelings of
"admiration and friendliness" which Owsley suggests existed in the
South at the beginning of the war.^ The flavour of the reporting
at the start of war supports more Edward Crapolfs thesis that
"Americans traditionally have distrusted, feared, and disliked 
18England." Therefore, it was easy for the press to let loose
feelings of invective against England, especially when Confederate 
fortunes were low.
The Trent affair, as we have already indicated, was the high 
point in Confederate expectations of British involvement in the war. 
When that opportunity passed there were few words of friendliness 
for England. The Savannah Republic published an article in
June 1862 that was reprinted in other papers:
the true policy of the Confederate States consists 
of cutting loose, in every practicable way, from 
British trade, British monopoly, and British 
bondage; that, in the regulation of our commercial 
treaties with nations abroad, we should discriminate
against enemies and in favour of friends.19
^Owsley, p.489.
18Edward Crapol, America for Americans: Economic Nationalism
and Anglophobia in the late Nineteenth Century (Westport,
Conn., 1973), p.4.
19Richmond Whig, 12 June, 1862.
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In the Richmond Whig a correspondent who signed himself Rule 
Slaveownia replied:
for a third of a century England has, by every 
appliance of her legislature, her oratory, her 
pulpit, her press, and her power, exerted herself 
to the utmost, not only to bring our institutions 
into disrepute, but to overthrow them entirely —  
and further that she has every interest to do so.20
European intervention was by this time no more than a shallow
hope. Antietam was to follow, the prospect of mediation had
failed, and by the summer of 1863 relations between the British and
21Confederates were at a very low ebb. The cool and aloof manner
of Palmerston's dealings with the Confederate Commissioner, an 
affirmation of Britain's presumed attitude to the Confederacy, was 
received as a bitter insult. There was an understandable 
frustration in the Confederate press. The Columbus Enquirer 
reacted with a strain of "King Cotton". It suggested that the 
Confederacy should, if it was possible to do so "without serious 
injury to herself,"
transfer to a more friendly power the commercial 
treasure that has given Great Britain half her 
prosperity and enabled her to maintain her supremacy 
on the high seas. Never has a more fit occasion 
offered to rebuke her heartlessness and perfidy; 
never a better opportunity to exemplify to the world 
the power of the resources of these States and the 
value of their friendship. Let Great Britain, when 
our hour of triumph comes, have cause to exclaim, in 
the language of her greatest dramatist
21Cullop, p.85.
55.
Oh, fool! fool! fool!
I am one whose hand,
Like the base Judean, threw a pearl away
Richer than all his tribe.22
The Confederate press searched for the motives to explain why 
Britain had turned away from what appeared to be her best interests, 
and assumed instead the stance of "strict neutrality". There were 
many references to the concepts of honour, humanity, civilisation, 
right, and selfishness. But underlying these, and many specific 
and sometimes outlandish notions, was the overwhelming notion of 
national self-interest. In April 1862 the Richmond Examiner put 
it this way:
It is idle to urge consideration of right or justice, 
against over-ruling motives of interest, real or 
fancied, present or prospective. The intensely 
practical character of English people, faithfully 
mirrored by the Government, never abandons the great 
object of national aggrandizement. Let them see 
their way clearly to that goal, and solid reasons 
enough will be found to support the policy that leads 
to it.23
Behind the notion of self-interest lay, however, the issue of 
slavery. This was not often debated in the press although it is 
to be sensed in the background and brought into focus through sharp 
references to abolitionist fanatics, sentimental cant, the 
extremists of Exeter Hall, and so on. In August 1861 the
22
Columbus Daily Enquirer, 10 October, 1863.
23Richmond Examiner, 20 April, 1863.
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Richmond Examiner did, however, print a major editorial on the 
place of slavery. It was a blend of hurt incredulity and 
aggression. The whole of the European public "is animated by the 
most unfriendly sentiment towards the Southern community.*' Other 
slaveholding countries, the article claimed, received no such 
criticisms Russia, Turkey, Spain, Brazil, and Portugal ("the 
peculiar protege of Abolitionist England*'). The answer was the 
withdrawal of the Confederacy from Europe, as it had already done 
from the Union;
Not till we prove ourselves independent of their 
opinions, above and beyond their help, will we 
obtain their amity and justice .... We must 
return disdain for disdain, defiance for calumny, 
put far from us the fallacy that we have any 
friend in the world .... On our own swords we 
must lean, on our own arms we must alone rely for 
help, till we shall no longer need any other.24
Other articles followed in a number of newspapers, in a 
similar vein. The strongest was also in the Examiner, in 
March 1863, which suggested that Britain sought to destroy slavery 
and, by so doing, destroy also the Union. Britain's attitude to 
the Civil War was, according to the Examiner, based on her place in 
world power politics. She already had supremacy in shipping and 
commerce that was based on "her insular position and vast colonial 
interests" and was thus secure. Her rich natural resources and 
cheap labour gave to Britain an advantage in "the mechanical arts 
and manufactures." The one great interest in which the United
24Richmond Examiner, 7 August, 1861.
States outstripped Britain, and which almost balanced Britain’s
other advantages, was cotton. Britain's continuing supremacy in
the world depended, therefore, on two possible measures: first,
the destruction of the cotton culture through the overthrow of the
institution of slavery; second, the Fomenting of "sectional
agitations" to force a separation of the Union. An attack on the
cotton culture, through an implicit support of the North, was
chosen because it would achieve both objectives simultaneously.
Britain would get her monopoly of the cotton supply by eliminating
Southern competition, and the Union would be divided because of the
"imbecility of the intellect in which the North allowed itself to
25be enlisted m  the mad work of self-destruction."
The Richmond Whig, in June 1863, got more directly to the 
point:
Talk of England's aversion to slavery —  she is 
averse to it, deeply, bitterly, fanatically —  the 
leader and stimulator, if you please, of the anti­
slavery agitation of the age —  but England is not 
so averse to anything, not so fixed in any principle, 
as to let it interfere with what is her interest.
Ask any time what is the interest of England .... to 
discover her policy or understand her conduct.26
The British did not need cotton as badly as the Confederate 
press thought. The economic consequences of the blockade were 
severe, but not the catastrophe that was envisaged by many on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The risk of war with the North and the
25 Ibid., 7 August, 1861.
O  £
Richmond Whig, 23 June, 1863.
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threat this would pose for the massive investment by British 
capitalists in railways, banking, land speculation and manufacturing 
was too high when balanced against the prospect of an outright 
Confederate victory. Also, Britain was fortunate in having a 
colonial cotton supply, embryonic and inferior in quality to the 
American, but a support system none the less. And, defence of the 
Confederacy would be seen as support for slavery. Without 
enormous advantages to go with it, this would have been politically 
impossible.
Therefore, the risks were too high and the returns too 
uncertain for the British to become embroiled in a dreadful 
conflagration of such magnitude. The Richmond Whig, in July 1862, 
put the balanced view:^
We have shared in the general sense of wrong and 
indignation, awakened in this country by the 
apparent heartlessness of England in the pending 
struggle. Perhaps we may have judged 
unreasonably. England is selfish, as what 
nation is not?27
Cullop suggests that the Richmond government lost patience
with Britain and shifted its attention to France by the autumn of 
28
1863. The Confederate press had started to do so by the early 
months of 1862, and continued to speak of French aid until at 
least 1864. France offered the advantage over Britain because
^Ibid., 14 July, 1862,
O Q
Cullop, p.86.
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she offered no apparent threat to slavery. Napoleon was a
practical statesman, claimed the Columbus Daily Enquirer, "Whose
policy is not biased by hereditary fanaticism or educational 
29
prejudice." And France, it could be claimed, had wanted to 
recognise the Confederacy but had been prevented because of 
British intransigence. "King Cotton" diplomacy this time offered 
inducements rather than threats.
The sagacious man who governs France is not 
tethered by ... peace societies. He acts from 
the great interests of his country. He could 
be readily brought to see the immense advantages 
which would accrue to France from a close and 
exclusive commercial alliance with the Southern 
States.30
In the final months of the Civil War the few papers that 
survived not surprisingly had little to say for either Britain or 
France. In January 1865 the Richmond Whig, in true form, damned 
them both. It predicted with evident glee that with the defeat of 
the Confederacy would grow an American power greater than any nation 
in the world. "Napoleon will find that he has finessed too deeply 
and lost the game," and soon France would not "hold a colony 
without consent" from the United States. But for Britain was 
reserved the greatest derision and hatred. She would lose Canada 
and the West Indies; her fleets would be driven from the oceans; 
American cruisers "would hang around the coast of Great Britain and
29Columbus Daily Enquirer, 20 February, 1862.
30Richmond Whig, 5 February, 1862.
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destroy her coasting trade": Ireland and India would go;
Australia would be retained only as long as America permitted it.
"Are these things dreams?1* the Whig asked rhetorically:
Look at what has been going on here for four 
years past, and then say what they are. Here 
is a power that within that time, has increased 
her navy from thirty ships to six hundred —  that 
has increased her marine from a few thousand 
sailors to fifty thousand. Here are two powers 
engaged in a deadly struggle, each of which has 
sent forth armies sufficient to have overwhelmed 
Great Britain and France. These two armies, the 
most tried and the best fighting in all the earth, 
will be combined. Recruits enough will be added 
to make a million men. They hate each other, 
but they hate England even more. At a signal —  
the very slightest —  this whole-force will be let 
loose upon her ....
In forty years, the population of the United States 
would be one hundred million. It would be the 
strongest nation the world ever beheld. Its 
influence over the whole world would be unparalleled 
owing to the weakness and timidity of France and 
England.31
In a satirical and powerful piece, the Mobile Daily Advertiser 
glanced back at the European response to "King Cotton". The 
blockade was set and England and France acquiesced: "Mr Ardent
Disposition" had claimed that when the cotton was spun and the 
stockpiles exhausted things would be different:
31Richmond Whig, 20 January, 1865.
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Let Manchester exhaust her stock; let her 
operatives fail to obtain employment, and begin 
to starve; and let it be seen that no raw 
material is forthcoming and that cotton-planting 
has ceased —  then the listless old Lion will 
begin to growl and ruffle his mane, and, mayhap, 
lash his sides with his tail and rouse the 
nations by his mighty roar. But, one after 
another factory stopped —  others ran on half or 
quarter time —  operatives began to starve sure 
enough, and a mighty cry of distress went up from 
the masses. 'Abe!' says A.D., 'its' coming —  
stand from under.' But to the disappointment of 
the said A.D., and all other ardent and expectant 
dreamers among us, the drowsy, lazy, self-interested 
old king of beasts, without raising his sleepy 
muzzle from his folded paws, simply opened one eye 
and said —  'FEED EM!'
And immediately 'Old England' became one great poor 
house, while sharp nosed Brother Jonathan allowed 
his potato trap to expand into a significant grin, 
and keen-sighted Southerners could just discern a 
gentle swaying of the digits of his right hand, 
while the thumb rested lightly upon the sharp 
pointed nasal protuberance; and thus burst the 
bubble of raising the blockade to secure a supply of 
cotton. The roar which was to blow Uncle Sam 
sky-high by its mighty concussions, simmered down to 
a never explained inaction, and the mane which was 
to be rumpled so belligerently remained in quiet 
placidity. In short, England kept out of the war 
with all her might and mane, and thus the mainstay 
of the rebellion failed to respond to our 'great 
expectations.'
As for the Gallic cock, he flapped his wings once or 
twice, but when he essayed to crow his voice failed 
him. For no sooner had he stretched forth his neck 
for the effort, flapping his wings close to the 
sleepy forest-monarch's nose, in order to attract his 
attention and obtain his assistance, then seeing the 
ruffled feathers on the American Eagles outstretched 
neck, and casting a slight glance from his flashing 
eye, then all sound and fury died away.32
32Mobile Daily Advertiser, 10 June, 1865.
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The Southern newspaper press was committed to European 
intervention in some form, and the expectation or hope that this 
would happen was the thread that ran through wartime editorial 
comment.
The movement from expectation or hope, to certainty and to 
despair, reflected the unhealthy reliance that the South placed on 
European, and especially British, support for the Confederate cause. 
This reliance at times seemed to shift responsibility from the 
Confederacy to Europe. Recognition by Britain of the sovereignty 
of the Southern States initially was expected as of right; the 
possibility that Britain might do otherwise seemed inconceivable.
The blockade was to be broken with scant regard for the 
consequences to Britain. The Trent affair was welcomed by the 
South because of the possibility that Britain would enter the war 
not so much as an ally of the Confederacy but as a direct 
antagonist of the North. In these matters the Confederacy had a 
passive role as far as the press seemed to suggest. The most 
favourable outcome, it often seemed, would be that Britain made war 
with the North thereby debilitating or defeating the enemy on the 
South’s behalf. Implicit in this attitude was a kind of fatalism 
that helps explain the frantic way that attention passed from 
Britain to France as friend and potential protector and the 
violence of the eventual denunciation of Britain.
But interwoven with this fatalism and the supporting rhetoric 
which espoused notions of brotherhood, kindred spirits, the 
mother-country and so on, was a realism that recognised national
self-interest as the ultimate influence in international affairs.
"King Cotton" was after all the starkest manifestation of that.
The newspapers advocated both directly and indirectly, and without
qualm or introspection, the naked use of the presumed power of
cotton in the interests of the South. This of course was to
prove a miscalculation. The crude aggression and the
enticement which underpinned the newspaper^ support for cotton
diplomacy did not work. For the British the awful consequences
of involvement in the war were unthinkable given the very high
risks balanced against probable gains. In international diplomacy
there are no unselfish acts; all the South could really hope for
was that their interests and those of England or, failing that,
France, would coincide. Thus, all nations are selfish and, as
the Richmond Whig so aptly expressed it, "The selfishness of
33
nations is patriotism.”
^Richmond Whig, 14 July, 1862.
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